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Abstract—The licensing model for millimeter wave bands has
been the subject of considerable debate, with some industry
players advocating for unlicensed use and others for traditional
geographic area exclusive use licenses. Meanwhile, the massive
bandwidth, highly directional antennas, high penetration loss
and susceptibility to shadowing in these bands suggest certain
advantages to spectrum and infrastructure sharing. However,
even when sharing is technically beneficial (as recent research
in this area suggests that it is), it may not be profitable. In this
paper, both the technical and economic implications of resource
sharing in millimeter wave networks are studied. Millimeter
wave service is considered in the economic framework of a
network good, where consumers’ utility depends on the size of
the network, and the strategic decisions of consumers and service
providers are connected to detailed network simulations. The
results suggest that “open” deployments of neutral small cells
that serve subscribers of any service provider encourage market
entry by making it easier for networks to reach critical mass,
more than “open” (unlicensed) spectrum would. The conditions
under which competitive service providers would prefer to share
resources or not are also described.
I. INTRODUCTION
The millimeter wave (mmWave) bands represent one of
the largest unlicensed bandwidths ever allocated, presenting
a tremendous opportunity for both technical and policy inno-
vation. The appropriate licensing model for this band remains
the subject of considerable debate. Replies to an FCC notice
of inquiry [1] requesting comments on usage of bands greater
than 24 GHz in the United States reveal disagreement on how
to best utilize this spectrum, with economic considerations
playing a significant role. Major industry players argued in
favor of exclusive use licensing on a geographic service area
basis, primarily on the grounds that this offers sufficient
certainty to motivate major capital investment. Several of these
explicitly asked the FCC to reject licensing mechanisms that
require spectrum sharing on some bands [2]–[8]. Others argued
that unlicensed use maximizes efficient spectrum use, and
encourages innovation and competition by lowering barriers to
entry [9], [10]. A recent notice of proposed rulemaking [11]
for these bands involves 3,850 MHz of spectrum, but does
not move on an additional 12,500 MHz of potentially useful
spectrum in bands above 24 GHz.
Beyond these business concerns, technical properties of
mmWave bands favor spectrum and infrastructure (base sta-
tion) sharing. While cellular frequencies have traditionally
been allocated with geographic area exclusive use licenses,
the physical characteristics of mmWave signals suggest that
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exclusive use licenses would be sub-optimal in these bands.
Specifically, in the mmWave space, the massive bandwidth
and spatial degrees of freedom are unlikely to be fully used
by any one cellular operator. The use of high-dimensional
antenna arrays implies that spectrum can be shared, not just
in time, but also in space. Furthermore, mmWave signals
observe high penetration loss through brick and glass [12],
and are highly susceptible to shadowing. This implies that
many more base stations are likely to be needed for wide area
coverage, significantly increasing the cost of deployment, thus
motivating infrastructure sharing.
However, technological justification for resouce sharing
does not always translate to economic benefits, for service
providers or for consumers. Network service providers are
mainly concerned with increasing profit, which is a function of
demand, price, and cost. Even when resource sharing improves
consumers’ quality of service, it may have a negative effect on
the service provider’s profits if it shifts demand to a competing
service provider, or if it changes the market dynamics in a
way that forces down the price. Similarly, consumers prefer
a higher quality of service, but they are also concerned
with service availability and price, which could potentially
be negatively affected by resource sharing. To gain a fuller
understanding of the benefits of resource sharing in mmWave
networks, we need to identify the specific impact on quality
of service, and then understand how this affects the demand,
price, and cost of service.
A. Contributions
The goal of this work is to model the strategic decisions of
wireless service providers in building out mmWave networks
with or without sharing of spectrum and/or infrastructure. We
apply economic models of network goods [13] - products
whose value to consumers depends on the number of units
sold - to mmWave cellular networks, where the value of the
network to the consumer depends on the size of the network
(in terms of base station and spectrum resources), and the
investment of the service provider in base station and spectrum
resources depends on its expected market share. We quantify
the positive and negative effects associated with increasing
network size, i.e., how a subscriber’s data rate changes as
the mmWave service provider increases its spectrum holdings,
base station deployments, and market share. Using the concept
of critical mass [14], we investigate the growth of demand
for a mmWave network service under three circumstances:
increasing a network from zero size by deploying base stations
and licensing spectrum, licensing spectrum but utilizing an
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2existing deployment of “open” small cells, and deploying
base stations but using unlicensed spectrum. We further model
the resource sharing decision of competing mmWave service
providers as a compatibility problem [15], [16].
The contributions of this work are primarily to connect the
performance of mmWave networks to economic models of
demand for these network services, as follows:
• We quantify the positive and negative effects of subscrib-
ing to a large service provider - one with greater base
station density, bandwidth, and number of subscribers -
as well as interactions between these. We find a strong
positive effect with increasing base station density in a
low-SNR regime, but only a weak positive effect with
increasing bandwidth. In high-SNR regimes, there is only
a weak positive effect with increasing base station density,
and this is partially mitigated by a very slight negative
interference effect. Moderate-SNR subscribers gain the
most from increasing bandwidth and base station density.
• Given these network effects, we consider the effect of
“open” resources on new service offerings, where the
primary concern of the provider is to establish a stable
presence in the market. We find that the slow initial
growth of demand at small network sizes makes it dif-
ficult for a new provider to reach critical mass. With an
existing deployment of “open” small cells, there is robust
demand even at small network sizes, which encourages
growth. Open spectrum (i.e., unlicensed) does not have
as encouraging an effect on market entry.
• We separately consider resource sharing between
mmWave service providers who are already established
in the market, and are mainly concerned with profit. We
apply the economic model of compatibility of network
goods to resource sharing in established mmWave cellular
networks. We describe a duopoly game involving two
vertically differentiated mmWave service providers with
and without resource sharing, and quantify the service
provider profits and market coverage in each case. We
find that providers may prefer to share spectrum and
base stations when the market is highly segmented, share
base stations when the spectrum is unlicensed, and share
spectrum when base stations are all “open”. Otherwise
the high-end service provider will prefer not to share
resources.
B. Related Work
The idea of resource sharing is, of course, not new; a
great deal of research effort has been devoted to quantifying
the benefits of base station and spectrum sharing in cellular
networks. In [17], the authors consider several sharing options
for LTE networks, and conclude that an arrangment similar to
a traditional roaming agreement offers the best performance
with the least complexity for inter-operator sharing. The au-
thors in [18] assess the benefit of sharing both infrastructure
and spectrum in the context of a proposed merger between
two major cellular operators in the United States, using real
base station deployment data to support their claims. In [19]
the authors investigate the trade-offs between infrastructure
sharing (which improves coverage and has a small positive
effect on data rate) and spectrum sharing (which has a positive
effect on data rate but reduces coverage probability), and find
that combining both kinds of sharing offers the best data rate
while partially mitigating the reduced coverage of spectrum
sharing. All of these, as well as others [20], [21], conclude that
under some conditions, resource sharing increases the capacity
of traditional cellular networks, but some find that spectrum
sharing without coordination in traditional cellular networks
creates interference and degrades performance relative to ex-
clusive use of spectrum by one operator.
Given the unique propagation characteristics of mmWave
networks, there has been renewed interest in resource sharing
in these bands. mmWave networks will require a denser
deployment of base stations than conventional frequencies,
increasing the appeal of base station sharing. Industry per-
spectives on 5G cellular networks [22] suggest a favorable
view of neutral small cells owned by a third party and shared
by multiple operators. With respect to spectrum sharing, as
opposed to conventional cellular frequencies, the inter-cell
interference in mmWave bands can be controlled by directional
transmissions [23]–[25], potentially allowing much greater
spectrum reuse. In [23], it is shown that with sufficient beam
directionality in the transmission pattern, the inter-cell inter-
ference is low enough to favor resource sharing even without
inter-operator coordination. These conclusions are supported
by [26], [27] for different channel models. However, in [25],
the authors show that inter-operator coordination is important
to users with poor data rates, especially in dense deployments.
Similarly, [28] proposes a spectrum sharing scheme with inter-
cell coordination to avoid inter-cell interference and increase
sharing gain.
With the exception of [19], all of these have consid-
ered resource sharing only in the case of symmetric service
providers (those with equivalent spectrum and base station
resources, and equal market share). On conventional cellular
frequencies, [19] shows that resource sharing benefits a large
service provider more than a small service provider, because
less interference is imposed by the small service provider.
However, in mmWave frequencies, where the effect of intercell
interference is much smaller, it is not clear whether this result
remains relevant.
Furthermore, even when full sharing is strictly beneficial
from a technical perspective, competitive dynamics between
service providers may discourage sharing unless there are
external incentives. With full resource sharing, subscribers
of all service providers have exactly the same quality of
service, making it difficult for service providers to distinguish
themselves in the market and gain market share. None of [19],
[23], [25], [26] consider this effect. In [23], the authors claim
that with resource sharing, a network operator requires less
bandwidth (and therefore, lower spectrum licensing costs) to
serve its subscribers with a given median rate. However, this
assumes that demand for network services is fixed, then it
actually varies according to the quality of service, and it also
ignores competition between service providers. The early work
on mmWave resource sharing also does not address the case of
asymmetric service providers, where the large service provider
3contributes more resources to the partnership, but then offers
its subscribers the same quality of service as the small service
provider.
Some of the literature on cellular networks addresses eco-
nomic or regulatory aspects of resource sharing. For exam-
ple, [29] models the tradeoff associated with competition reg-
ulation and resource sharing in the context of the planned evo-
lution of cellular networks. A coalition game described in [30]
suggests that resource sharing and cooperation can sometimes
improve individual cellular service providers’ payoff. A ten-
year case study on cellular service providers in Sweden [31]
lists incentives, obstacles, and key drivers for cooperation,
and a similar investigation of cellular infrastructure sharing
in emerging markets is described in [32]. However, none of
these address resource sharing in mmWave networks which,
as mentioned above, are fundamentally different from previous
cellular networks in ways that can affect the decision to share
resources or not. An early economic perspective on mmWave
networks (although not on resource sharing) in [33] suggests
that the limited coverage range of mmWave-based 5G systems
is a key challenge for its cost efficiency. Resource sharing
could potentially be a way to address this challenge, but
the economic implications of resource sharing in mmWave
networks have not been studied yet.
C. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We begin
with a brief introduction to the economic framework used in
this paper, in Section II. In Section III, we describe the system
model and simulation results showing the benefit of resource
sharing in mmWave networks with respect to fifth percentile
rate. Section IV describes mmWave service as a network good
(in the economic sense), and uses simulation results to quantify
the network externalities associated with increasing network
size. We build on results from Section III and Section IV in
Section V to show how demand for mmWave network services
evolves as a service provider increases its network size, and
we compare the likelihood of market entry with and without
“open” resources such as unlicensed spectrum or an open
deployment of neutral small cells. In Section VI, we describe a
duopoly game involving two vertically differentiated mmWave
network service providers, and compare their profits with and
without resource sharing, for simultaneous market entry and
sequential market entry. Finally, in Section VII, we conclude
with a discussion of the implications of this work and areas
of further research.
II. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS
We briefly summarize here the economic framework used
in the rest of this paper. We define a network good and show
how its demand is fundamentally different from demand for
non-network goods, give equilbria and conditions for reaching
critical mass in a market for a network good, explain the
concept of compatibility, and describe a model of vertically
differentiated network good. For a more detailed overview of
this area of economics, see [13].
A. Network goods
In economics, a network good or service [13] is a product
for which the utility that a consumer gains from the product
varies with the number of other consumers of the product
(the size of the network). This effect on utility - which is
called the network externality or the network effect - may be
direct or indirect. The classic example of a direct network
effect is the telephone network, which is more valuable when
the service has more subscribers. The classic example of an
indirect effect is the hardware-software model, e.g. a consumer
who purchases an Android smartphone will benefit if other
consumers also purchase Android smartphones, because this
will incentivize the development of new and varied applica-
tions for the Android platform. The network externality may
also be negative, for example, if an Internet service provider
becomes oversubscribed, its subscribers will suffer from the
congestion externality.
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Fig. 1. An example of demand curves for a series of expected network sizes
(dashed lines, each labeled with expected network size ne), and the fulfilled
expectations demand curve p(n;n) (solid line), which is the collection of
points where the demand curve for an expected network of size ne intersects
the vertical line at n = ne. Three equilibria for a perfectly competitive market
with marginal cost c = 0.1 are labeled in white text on a dark background,
one at n = 0 and two at the intersesctions of p(n;n) and p = c (dotted
line).
A fundamental difference between a network good and one
with no network effects is the behavior of the demand curve,
which describes the relationship between two key quantities:
consumer demand for a good, n (or equivalently, the number
of units of the good that are sold i.e., network size), and the
price of the good, p.
Consider a set of consumers in a market for a non-network
good. The total demand for the good, n, is normalized so that
n = 1 when all consumers purchase the good, and n = 0 when
no consumers purchase the good. A consumers’ willingness
to pay for the good is ω, with ω varying among the set of
consumers up to ωˆ (different consumers are willing to pay
different prices for an identical good). A consumer of type ω
is indifferent between purchasing the good or not when price
p = ω. For p > ωˆ, none of the consumers will purchase the
good (n = 0), because it is too expensive even for consumers
with the highest value of ω. At p = 0, all of the consumers
4will purchase the good (n = 1). The demand curve, which
indicates what portion of the consumers will purchase the good
at a given price, has a negative slope for most kinds of non-
network goods, because the quantity demanded n (typically
shown on the horizontal axis) increases as the price of the good
p (typically shown on the vertical axis) decreases. Conversely,
to increase demand for a typical non-network good, a producer
of the good must reduce its price. The dashed line labeled
“1.0” in Fig. 1 shows a sample demand curve when ω is
distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1].
Now let us consider a network good. We still assume
heterogenous consumers, with type ω up to ωˆ, but a consumer
of type ω has willingness to pay ωh(n), where n is the network
size, and h(n) is a network externalities function indicating
how consumer utility scales with n. For a positive network
externality, h(n) increases with n, and for a negative network
externality h(n) decreases with n. A consumer purchasing the
good at price p gains utility u(ω, n, p) = ωh(n)− p.
Under these circumstances, a consumers’ decision to pur-
chase the good or not depends on how many units of the good
they expect will be sold, i.e., the expected network size ne.
A consumer of type ω is indifferent between purchasing the
good or not when p = ωh(ne). We can draw a demand curve
for any expected network size ne. For p > ωˆh(ne), none of
the consumers will purchase the good (n = 0). For p = 0,
all will purchase the good (n = 1). At the point where the
demand curve intersects the vertical line at n = ne, i.e., when
the demand for the good at a given price equals the expected
network size, we say that consumers’ expectations are fulfilled.
We can construct a series of such demand curves p(n;ne)
for different values of ne. Each curve gives the willingness
to pay of the nth consumer when the expected size of the
network is ne. The collection of points at n = ne, where
the actual size of the network and consumers’ expectations
regarding the size of the network are the same, then make up
the fulfilled expectations demand curve, p(n;n). Fig. 1 shows
the fulfilled expectations demand curve p(n;n) and demand
curves for selected values of ne when h(n) = n and ω is
distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1].
This fulfilled expectations demand curve gives the size of
the network that could be supported at equilibrium for a given
price, in the same way that the demand curve for a typical
non-network good defines the demand that can be supported
at a given price. We notice two key differences between the
behavior of the demand curve for a network good and a non-
network good.
First, the demand for a network good depends on the
consumers’ expected utility, which in turn depends on the
expected network size ne. However, the expected network
size depends on consumer demand, creating a self-fulfilling
expectation. When many consumers expect the good to be
unpopular, they will not purchase the good, and the network
size will be small.
Second, we note that although a traditional demand curve
always slopes down, the fulfilled expectations demand curve
first increases with n, then decreases. That is, for goods with
a positive network externality, p(n;n) first increases with
n due to the network externality, but eventually begins to
slope downward, as it becomes increasingly difficult to find
customers who have not yet purchased the good, but have
a high enough willingness to pay for it. For a traditional
good, to gain market share a producer has to reduce the price.
For a network good, a producer can sometimes demand a
higher price as more units of the good are sold, because the
consumers’ utility increases with the number of units sold.
B. Equilbria and critical mass
An important feature of a fulfilled expectations demand
curve is how it relates to the size of a network at equilibrium,
and particularly, how it relates to the critical mass of the
network: the smallest network size that can be sustained in
equilibrium [14].
In a monopoly, the producer of the good has no competition
to drive down the price. The fulfilled expectations demand
curve p(n;n) defines the price that the producer can charge to
sustain demand of size n, earning total revenue of np(n;n).
The producer will choose the network size that maximizes its
profits pi(n, p, c) = n(p(n;n) − c), where c is the marginal
cost, i.e., the cost to the producer of providing one unit of the
good [14].
In a perfectly competitive market, with many producers of-
fering goods that are perfect substitutes, competing producers
will drive down the price until it is equal to marginal cost, i.e.
p(n;n) = c, yielding three possible equilibria when c is less
than the maximum of p(n;n):
1) one stable equilibrium at n = 0 (representing a zero size
network),
2) an unstable equilibrium for a network of size n′ at the
first (smaller n) intersection of the fulfilled expectations
demand curve p(n;n) with the horizontal line p = c,
and
3) a stable equilibrium for a network of size n′′ at the sec-
ond (larger n) intersection of p(n;n) and the horizontal
p = c.
These are illustrated in Fig. 1. When the line p = c intersects
p(n;n) once, at its maximum value, there is a stable equilib-
rium at that point and one at n = 0. When c is greater than
the maximum value of p(n;n), the producers would only be
able to sell the good at a loss, so the only equilibrium will be
at n = 0, and no producer will offer the good [14].
It is shown in [14] that under perfect competition, the critical
mass is equal to the network size n0 at which p(n;n) is
maximized. At this point, competing pressures on demand
are perfectly balanced. For network sizes between zero and
n′, there is “downward pressure” toward the first equilibrium
at n = 0, since there are not enough consumers willing to
pay for the good at the lowest price at which the producer
is prepared to offer it. When n′ < n < n′′, there are more
consumers willing to pay price c, and the service increases
in value as more units are sold, exerting “upward pressure”
on the demand toward the equilibrium at n′′. For n > n′′,
there is again “downward pressure” on the demand toward n′′
because producers are trying to sell the good to the part of the
population with a low willingness to pay.
5Because of these pressures on demand, n′′ has a strong
stability property, and n′ is highly unstable. A producer
entering a new market is interested in selling enough units at a
small network size for the network to grow to at least n′, since
beyond that “tipping point” the upward pressure on demand
helps the network reach its non-zero stable equilibrium. The
slope of the fulfilled expectations demand curve p(n;n) for
small network sizes is very important, since it describes how
easy it is for the network size to reach critical mass. When
this slope is large, then for a given value of c, n′ occurs at a
smaller network size, making it easier to reach critical mass
and from there, the stable equilibrium at n′′.
C. Compatibility
In the previous section, we model a consumer’s willingness
to pay for good i as ωh(ni), where h(ni) is the network
externalities function and ni is the number of consumers who
have purchased the good. In this model, h(ni) is not affected
by the number of units sold of any other good. Now we
consider a market where producers may choose to make their
goods compatible [15], [16]. When two network goods are
compatible, then the total network effect for a consumer of
either good is based on the sum network size of both goods,
so the network externalities function for good i is evaluated
using the total network size for all the goods: h(
∑
j∈I nj),
where I is a set of firms producing compatible goods and
i ∈ I .
A firm producing a network good has conflicting incentives
for and against compatibility:
• Positive network externalities: A firm that makes its
product compatible increases its value to consumers,
since the argument to h(·) is greater.
• Market power: A firm that chooses to make its product in-
compatible reduces the value of its competitors’ product,
so it avoids losing market share, and can charge higher
prices.
Compatibility is often used to model a firm’s choice to use a
proprietary technical standard or a common industry standard.
For example, the developers of a word processing application
might choose to use a proprietary file format so that all
consumers who need to open these files must purchase their
software, or they might choose to use an open standard so that
their users can share the files produced with their software with
users of other word processors.
D. Vertical differentiation
In our previous model, when two network goods are com-
patible, consumers prefer them equally, since the value of the
network externalities function is the same for both. This can
shift demand from one producer to another. A producer may
try to disinguish itself from competitors by improving the
value of its good in other ways (not by increasing n). For
example, consumers of Android-based smartphones benefit
from the network effects due to consumers of all Android-
compatible smartphones. However, a firm that produces An-
droid phones can distinguish itself in the market by selling
handsets with better hardware specifications than its competi-
tors’.
In Section VI of this paper, where we consider service
providers that are already well established in the market, we
use a model of consumer utility described in [34] which
includes vertical differentiation. In this model, a consumer’s
willingness to pay for good i is ωqi + qih(
∑
j∈I nj), where
I is a set of firms producing compatible goods, i ∈ I , and
qi is a scaling factor that represents aspects of the good’s
quality that are not a function of the network size. Firms that
produce compatible goods can distinguish themselves from
one another by choosing different quality levels. However, a
firm that chooses to produce a higher-quality good also has
higher marginal costs. Where c was a constant marginal cost
in previous sections, now we scale marginal cost according to
the quality level, so that the cost to the producer of producing
one unit of good i at quality level qi is qi, and its profits are
pii(qi, ni, pi) = nipi − qini.
E. Application to mmWave network service
Given this economic framework, we are interested in mod-
eling mmWave network service as a network good, to better
understand:
• What kind of network effects apply to mmWave network
service? What is the relative benefit to a consumer of
subscribing to a large service provider? (Section IV)
• What is the behavior of the fulfilled expectations demand
curve for mmWave network service? How difficult is it
for a service provider just entering the market to reach
critical mass? Do open resources help a service provider
reach critical mass? (Section V)
• Under what conditions will mmWave network service
providers want to share resources? Is it desirable for a
regulator to enforce resource sharing? (Section VI)
To answer these questions, we must connect the economic
models described in this section to an accurate technical model
of mmWave cellular systems, described in Section III.
III. TECHNICAL BENEFITS OF RESOURCE SHARING
In this section, we describe the system model of the
mmWave network used in the rest of the paper. We outline
the technical benefits of resource sharing between identical
service providers, confirming some of the results of [23], [25]–
[27]. We also describe the sharing gains achieved by service
providers that are asymmetric with respect to number of
subscribers, spectrum holdings, and base station deployments.
The simulations of this section will be used in Section IV and
Section V to devise an economic model for mmWave resource
sharing.
A. mmWave System Model
We consider a system with multiple mmWave network
service providers (NSPs) operating in the 73 GHz band. A
service provider i ∈ {1, . . . , I} has bandwidth Wi, a set
of base stations (BSs) distributed in the network area using
a homogeneous Poisson Point Process (hPPP) with intensity
6λBi , and a set of user equipment (UEs) whose locations are
modeled by an independent hPPP with intensity λUi .
Both BSs and UEs use antenna arrays for directional beam-
forming. For the sake of tractability, we approximate the actual
array patterns using a simplified pattern as in [24], [35]. Let
G(φ) denote the simplified antenna directivity pattern depicted
in Fig. 2, where M is the main lobe power gain, m is the back
lobe gain and θ is the beamwidth of the main lobe. In general,
m and M are proportional to the number of antennas in the
array and M/m depends on the type of the array. Furthermore,
θ is inversely proportional to the number of antennas, i.e., the
greater the number of antennas, the more beam directionality.
We let GB(φ) (which is parameterized by MB , mB , and
θB) be the antenna pattern of the BS, and GU (φ) (which is
parameterized by MU , mU , and θU ) be the antenna pattern
of the UE.
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Fig. 2. Simplified antenna pattern with main lobe M , back lobe m and
beamwidth θ.
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Fig. 3. Intercell interference from base station Bm received at the UE U
j
k ,
which is associated with neighboring base station Bk . φD is the departure
angle from Bm and φA is the arrival angle at U
j
k .
We consider a time-slotted downlink of a mmWave cellular
system. The channel model we use includes path loss, shad-
owing, outage, and small scale fading. For path loss, shadow-
ing, and outage, line of sight (LOS), and NLOS probability
distributions, we use models adopted from [36]. We assume
Rayleigh block fading. Finally, the data rate is modeled as
R = (1− α)W log2
(
1 + β
PGU (0)GB(0)H
NfN0W + I
)
, (1)
where α and β (which are specified in Section III-C) are
overhead and loss factors, respectively, and are introduced to
fit a specific physical layer to the Shannon capacity curve.
Furthermore, P is the BS transmit power, H is the channel
power gain derived from the model discussed above, and
Nf , N0, W and I are UE noise figure, noise power spectral
density, bandwidth, and interference power, respectively. We
assume perfect beam alignment between BS and UE within a
cell, therefore the antenna power gain (link directionality) is
GU (0)GB(0) = MUMB . The SINR of a UE is defined as
PGU (0)GB(0)H
NfN0W+I
.
Let Bk denote the BS of cell k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, where K
is the total number of cells. Also, let U jk denote the UE j ∈
{1, . . . , Nk} of cell k, where Nk is the total number of the
UEs in cell k. We do not introduce any intercell coordination to
manage interference. The power of intercell interference from
base station Bm received at UE U
j
k depends on the beamwidth
θ, the arrival angle φA at U jm, and the departure angle φD from
Bk, as shown in Fig. 3. In the scenario illustrated we have
I = PGU (φA)G
B(φD)H
k,j
m , where H
k,j
m here is the channel
gain between Bm and U
j
k . While the probability of strong
intercell interference is low due to the beam directionality,
interference still exists. There are four main factors affecting
intercell interference:
• Frequency: The interference signal is weaker at high
frequencies due to path loss [23].
• Antenna Pattern: Antenna pattern parameters, especially
the beamwidth (θ in Fig. 2), directly affect the intercell
interference. A larger beamwidth results in stronger in-
tercell interference [23], [24].
• UE and BS density: In mmWave networks, strong
intercell interference occurs infrequently in sparse net-
works [24]. This is also true for conventional cellular
networks (like LTE), but with the greater beam direction-
ality used in mmWave networks, the network becomes
interference limited for much higher UE and BS densities
than in conventional networks. However, for ultra-dense
deployments, intercell interference can be dominant even
with high beam directionalities if there is no coordina-
tion [24], [25].
• Bandwidth: When the network bandwidth is large, noise
power becomes the dominant factor and interference is
less important [36].
We consider two kinds of intercell interference. Intra-NSP
interference comes from transmissions of neighboring BSs to
UEs of the same NSP. Inter-NSP interference comes from
transmissions of neighboring BSs to UEs of a different NSP
on the same frequency, and occurs only when the service
providers use spectrum on a non-exclusive basis.
To model interference, we consider four kinds of resource
use:
1) Exclusive Spectrum, Exclusive BSs (No Sharing):
Each NSP works independently on its own part of the
spectrum, with its own BSs. Obviously, there is no inter-
NSP interference. Each UE associates with the closest
BS belonging to its own NSP.
2) Exclusive Spectrum, Non-Exclusive BSs (BS Sharing
Only): A UE associates with the closest BS, regardless
of which NSP it belongs to. As a result, the average
distance between a UE and its serving BS is reduced,
which leads to a higher received signal power. However,
this also increases the intra-NSP interference power
relative to the no sharing case, because the distance
between the interferer BSs and a UE shrinks along with
cell radius. There is no inter-NSP interference.
73) Non-Exclusive Spectrum, Exclusive BSs (Spectrum
Sharing Only): NSPs use spectrum on a non-exclusive
basis. Besides for the increase in noise power due to
larger bandwidth, inter-NSP interference also occurs in
addition to intra-NSP interference, and these together
decrease the SINR of UEs compared to the previous
cases, but may still increase the rate.
4) Non-Exclusive Spectrum, Non-Exclusive BSs (Full
Sharing): NSPs use both spectrum and BSs on a non-
exclusive basis. This case is a combination of Case 2
and Case 3.
B. Scheduling
Early work on resource sharing in mmWave networks [23],
[25]–[27] has focused on signal propagation and interference
effects in networks with shared resources. To approximate
data rate at a UE, these papers divide the link capacity as
determined by the UE’s average SINR by the total number
of UEs in the cell. In a realistic network with opportunistic
scheduling, however, a UE may achieve a higher data rate
than its average SINR would suggest, because it is scheduled
with higher priority in time slots when its SINR is high.
This scheduling gain increases with the number of UEs.
For an economic analysis we need to accurately model how
consumers’ utility scales with all aspects of network size,
including the number of subscribers, so our model must
include this scheduling gain.
We adopt a modified scheduler based on the multicell
temporal fair opportunistic scheduler proposed in [37]. We use
only the first stage (UE nomination stage) of this scheduler,
since there is no coordination among the BSs. We expect
the difference from the two-stage scheduler with coordina-
tion to be neglible, since intercell interference is limited
by the directional nature of the transmissions in mmWave
networks [27]. Thus each BS runs the scheduler and selects
a UE independently, without considering intercell interference
and making scheduling decisions based only on the signal to
noise ratio of the UEs in each time slot.
C. Performance Evaluation
In order to establish benefits of resouce sharing from
a technical perspective, we present simulation results of a
mmWave network with two NSPs (i ∈ {1, 2}) operating in
the 73 GHz band. We fix BS transmit power (P ) and loss
factor (β) as 30 dBm and 0.5, respectively, as in [36]. Table I
shows the specific parameters we use in the simulations. We
assume two different cases: symmetric NSPs and asymmetric
NSPs. In the symmetric case, NSPs are identical in terms of
network resource (BS density, bandwidth) and UE density.
In the asymmetric case, one of the NSPs has more network
resources and UE density than the other. Parameters such as
UE and BS densities (λUi , λ
B
i ), and bandwidth (Wi) will be
specified for each NSP separately.
1) Symmetric NSPs: Fig. 4 shows the cumulative distribu-
tion function (CDF) of the UE rate, for symmetric NSPs, each
with 500 MHz of 73 GHz spectrum licensed for exclusive use,
50 BSs, and 250 UEs in a single square kilometer. All UEs
TABLE I
NETWORK PARAMETERS
Parameter Value
Frequency 73 GHz
Total bandwidth (W1 +W2) 1 GHz
Total BS density (λB1 +λ
B
2 ) 100 BSs/km
2
Total BS density (λU1 +λ
U
2 ) 500 UEs/km
2
BS transmit power P 30 dBm
BS antenna model (MB ,mB ,θB) (20 dB, -10 dB, 5◦)
UE antenna model (MU ,mU ,θU ) (10 dB, -10 dB, 30◦)
Rate model (α, β) (0.2, 0.5)
UE noise figure Nf 7 dB
Noise PSD N0 -174 dBm/Hz
Simulation duration T 105 slots
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Fig. 4. There is a positive effect on UE rate when symmetric NSPs pool
their BS and spectrum resources.
benefit the most from when the NSPs pool both spectrum and
BSs. However, both spectrum sharing alone and BS sharing
alone improve UE rate relative to the case where no resources
are shared. BS sharing has a greater effect on rate than
spectrum sharing for UEs outside the coverage range or with
a poor signal quality. For UEs in outage, BS sharing improves
coverage probability. For UEs with a low SNR, there is little
benefit to adding bandwidth because they are in a power-
limited regime. UEs with a good signal quality (high SNR)
are bandwidth-limited and benefit more from spectrum sharing
than from BS sharing. At this BS density (100 BSs total per
square kilometer), the effects of interference are neglible due
to the directional nature of the transmissions, so there is no
negative effect due to spectrum sharing without coordination.
When two NSPs pool their BS and spectrum resources,
they offer UEs a higher data rate. This is consistent with
the results described in [23], [25]–[27]. However, the early
work on mmWave resource sharing in [23], [25]–[27] does
not consider NSPs, which we address next.
2) Asymmetric NSPs: Fig. 5 shows the CDF of UE rate
for consumers of two asymmetric NSPs operating in the same
geographic area. The larger NSP has 70% of resources and
subscribers: 700 MHz of 73 GHz spectrum licensed for ex-
clusive use, 70 BSs, and 350 UEs in a single square kilometer.
The smaller NSP has 30% of resources and subscribers: 300
MHz of spectrum, 30 BSs, and 150 UEs.
When there is no resource sharing, the larger NSP gains
market power by offering its subscribers a higher rate than
8Small service provider (30%) Large service provider (70%)
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Fig. 5. When asymmetric NSPs share spectrum and BS resources, they provide a higher quality of service, but are no longer able to differentiate themselves
on the data rates they offer.
competing services. With fully shared resources, however,
their subscribers’ rate distributions are identical and the ser-
vices are perfect substitutes. Sharing increases the value of
the service that both NSPs offer, but eliminates the ability of
the larger NSP to distinguish itself in the market by offering
higher rates.
With only spectrum sharing or only BS sharing, the larger
NSP retains some ability to differentiate itself in the market
by offering higher rates. However, even under these circum-
stances, the small NSP enjoys greater relative gains than the
large NSP from sharing of any kind (compared to no sharing),
while the large NSP contributes more resources. The small
NSP especially benefits from full sharing or BS sharing by
increasing the coverage probability of UEs that were in outage.
This gives it an extra competitive edge in the market among
consumers who consider stability and coverage probability as
a primary factor in choosing their NSP.
IV. MMWAVE SERVICE AS A NETWORK GOOD
In the simulations of Section III, we assumed a fixed number
of UEs and resources. Now we model mmWave network
service as a network good (as explained in Section II), with
varying demand and resources. Subscribers benefit from an
indirect positive network externality: a large wireless service
provider with more subscribers will build a denser deployment
of BSs, and purchase more spectrum. (Given large available
bandwidth at mmWave frequencies, we expect it will be
feasible for NSPs to acquire more spectrum at will.) We
describe the impact of increasing network size on consumers’
data rates, using the simulation described in Section III.
The network size n of a mmWave network is defined
differently depending on the scenario:
• No open resources: In this scenario, an NSP scales its
spectrum licenses and BSs according to the number of
subscribers it has. Network size, n, is the normalized
demand for the service, but is also a scaling factor on
the BS density (λB) and bandwidth (W ) of the NSP.
• Open BS deployment: In this scenario, there is a pre-
existing deployment of neutral small cells, operated by
a coalition of service providers or by a third party (as
suggested in [22]). These cells have an open association
policy, and will serve UEs of any NSP. Network size, n,
refers to demand for the service and is also a scaling
factor on the bandwidth of the NSP, W , but the BS
density of the NSP is constant and equal to the size of
the “open” deployment (λBmax) for all values of n.
• Open spectrum: In this scenario, spectrum is unlicensed
and may be used by any NSP. Here, n refers to demand
for the service and is also a scaling factor on the BS
density of the NSP, λB . However, the bandwidth of
the NSP is constant and equal to the full unlicensed
bandwidth Wmax for all values of n.
Note that the use of “open” resources is not the same as sharing
resources acquired by individual NSPs. Open resources are
fixed in size and available to all NSPs. Shared resources
are also available to participating NSPs, but their size varies
according to the network size of the NSPs. Table II enumerates
the BS density and bandwidth used by NSP i in all three
scenarios, when there is no sharing between individual NSPs
and when resources are shared among NSPs in I , with i ∈ I .
Resources that are used by NSP i on a non-exclusive basis are
in bold font.
TABLE II
SCALING RESOURCES WITH NETWORK SIZE
No open re-
sources
Open BS de-
ployment
Open
spectrum
No sharing λBi niλ
B
max λ
B
max niλ
B
max
Wi niWmax niWmax Wmax
Sharing λBi
∑
j∈I njλ
B
max λ
B
max
∑
j∈I njλ
B
max
Wi
∑
j∈I njWmax
∑
j∈I njWmax Wmax
Depending on the scenario, the total network externality
h(n) is the sum of the network effects associated with up to
three aspects of n. We separately quantify the contribution to
h(n) of each:
1) BS density: We simulate a network of increasing BS
density, with bandwidth constant at 1 GHz and ratio of
UEs to BSs constant at 5 UEs per BS. To separately
quantify the effect of interference, we also compute
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show 95% bootstrap confidence intervals.
the UE rate based on SNR (neglecting the effect of
interference) and compare this to the actual UE rate.
These results are shown in Fig. 6.
2) Bandwidth: We simulate a network of increasing band-
width, while keeping BS density constant at a moderate
value of 100 BSs per square kilometer, and UE density
constant at 500 UEs per square kilometer. These results
are shown in Fig. 7.
3) UE density: We simulate a network of increasing UE
density, while keeping bandwidth constant at 1 GHz and
BS density constant at 100 BSs per square kilometer.
To quantify the scheduling gain, we also simulate this
network with a round robin scheduler, and compare this
to UE rate with a partially opportunistic scheduler. These
results are shown in Fig. 8.
We assume that consumers decide whether or not to sub-
scribe to a mmWave network based on its fifth percentile
rates. This is supported by research on human behavior,
which suggests that service reliability is rated more highly
than overall connection quality in perceived quality of mobile
value-added services [38]. We take fifth percentile rate as a
proxy for service reliability.
From Fig. 6, Fig. 7, and Fig. 8, we find that the fifth
percentile data rate of UEs is affected by network size as
l
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Fig. 8. Effect of increasing UE density per BS as bandwidth is held constant
at 1 GHz and BS density is held constant at 100 BSs per square kilometer.
Error bars show 95% bootstrap confidence intervals.
follows:
1) BS density: (Fig. 6) As BS density increases, UEs
transition between three regions, marked by the vertical
lines in Fig. 6. In the outage region on the left, the
deployment of mmWave BSs is very sparse, and UEs
are likely to be outside the coverage area. In the middle
region, increasing BS density improves the probability
of having a LOS link, and so the rate grows very quickly
with BS density until a point at which virtually all links
are LOS. In the third region, there is a smaller marginal
benefit associated with higher BS density due to increas-
ing SNR. When the deployment of BSs is extremely
dense, there may be a small negative interference effect
that partially mitigates the positive effect of increasing
BS density, consistent with [25].
2) Bandwidth: (Fig. 7) For UEs with a moderate or high
SNR, link capacity scales linearly with bandwidth, so
these will benefit from subscribing to a large service
provider with more mmWave spectrum holdings. How-
ever, UEs with a very weak signal power (e.g., in a
network where the density of BSs is very low) are
power-limited and do not benefit much from increased
bandwidth.
3) UE density: (Fig. 8) Given a fixed number of BSs,
increasing the total number of UEs can overburden the
network and create a negative congestion externality.
Specifically, when there are N UEs in the cell, each
UE is allocated approximately 1N th of frequency-time
resources. However, because the scheduling of UEs
is partially opportunistic, a UE is more likely to be
scheduled in high-SINR time periods, and this effect
increases with the number of UEs in the cell as the
“competition” to be scheduled becomes more intense.
Thus with an increasing number of UEs in a cell, an
individual UE is scheduled in fewer time slots, but has
a higher average data rate in the time slots in which it
is scheduled.
In general, the benefit to a UE of increasing any of the
three elements of network size discussed above depends on the
UE’s signal quality. In sparse deployments, UEs are outside the
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Fig. 9. Effect of increasing network size on fifth percentile UE rate. Error
bars show 95% bootstrap confidence intervals.
coverage area or at its edge, and derive little or no benefit from
increasing bandwidth alone. Under moderate SNR conditions,
UEs benefit both from increasing BS density and increasing
bandwidth. In a very dense network, virtually all UEs have a
LOS link and high SNR, and have little to gain from increasing
BS density, but benefit from increasing bandwidth.
V. DEMAND FOR MMWAVE SERVICES, WITH AND
WITHOUT OPEN RESOURCES
Having quantified the technical effects on fifth percentile
rate of increasing mmWave network size in Section IV, we
focus on how demand for wireless service, price an NSP
can charge, and NSP’s revenue, depend on network size. We
are especially interested in the evolution of demand at small
network sizes, when an NSP first begins to offer mmWave
services, and whether the network will reach critical mass. To
address this, we model the willingness to pay of consumers as
a function of n (using h(n)), then construct a curve of fulfilled
expectations demand p(n;n) that shows how demand, price,
and revenue scale with n. We assume again that consumers
decide to subscribe or not based on fifth percentile rates,
and consider the three scenarios (no open resources, open BS
deployment, and open spectrum) in the “No sharing” row in
Table II.
Fig. 9 shows the simulated fifth percentile rate for UEs in
a mmWave network, from which we derive h(n) empirically.
In the open BS deployment scenario, 100 BSs are available
regardless of n; in the open spectrum scenario, bandwidth is
1 GHz at all values of n. Otherwise, bandwidth, BS density,
and the number of UEs in the network scale with n up to
1 GHz, 100 BSs, and 500 UEs, respectively, at n = 1. We
note that the behavior of the fifth percentile rate is roughly
piecewise linear in n, with breakpoints when we transition
between the SNR regions of Section IV.
Next, we construct a fulfilled expectations demand curve for
each of the three scenarios, using the values in Fig. 9 for the
network externalities function h(n). We assume consumers are
heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for service, and the
parameter ω, which denotes the consumer type, is uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]. A consumer of type ω subscribing to
the network will gain surplus u(ω, n, p) = ωh(n)− p from a
network of size n at price p.
The fulfilled expectations demand curve in Fig. 10 is
constructed as described in Section II. We also show the
revenue of the NSP, np(n;n). We observe in Fig. 10 the
initially upward-sloping fulfilled expectations demand curve
p(n;n) that is a feature of network goods.
The slope of this curve at small network sizes is worthy of
extra attention. As described in Section II, this determines how
easily the network will reach critical mass in a perfectly com-
petitive market where competing networks are homogeneous
in every way except for size.
• When there are no open resources, the slope of p(n;n)
is small for 0 ≤ n ≤ 0.262, suggesting that the marginal
benefit of increasing network size is very small when
the network size is small. Under these conditions, it is
difficult for a network to reach its tipping point.
• When there is an open BS deployment, there is robust
demand and strong marginal network externalities even
at very small network sizes. Assuming a pre-existing BS
deployment, is relatively easy to reach the tipping point
under these circumstances.
• With open spectrum, the positive slope of p(n;n) is large
for moderate network sizes, but again there is a very small
positive slope when n is small (n ≤ 0.235).
We observe that there is a strong marginal network externality
at small network sizes when there is an open BS deployment,
and NSPs can grow their network by incrementally adding
spectrum holdings and subscribers. This suggests that based
purely on the ability of a small NSP to generate revenue
(not considering startup costs) and to reach its tipping point,
an open BS deployment could ease the barrier to entry for
cellular network providers who are considering extending
their networks to include mmWave service, encouraging new
service offerings. Furthermore, we note that open BSs help
encourage new service offerings more than open (shared or
unlicensed) spectrum would. However, the open BS scenario
relies on a third party having invested in BSs, potentially ahead
of demand if there are no existing mmWave NSPs in the
market yet and the BSs are only useful for mmWave service.
The open spectrum approach relies only on regulators having
released the spectrum for unlicensed use in cellular systems.
VI. RESOURCE SHARING IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET
Now we turn our attention to mmWave NSPs that are al-
ready established, and are mainly concerned with maximizing
their profits in a competitive market, rather than struggling
to reach critical mass. We model the NSPs’ decision to
share mmWave network resources or not as a compatibility
problem (introduced in Section II), where mmWave NSPs
are considered compatible if their subscribers can connect to
any of the set of NSPs’ BSs, and use a bandwidth equal to
their pooled spectrum holdings. We previously addressed the
technical benefits of this in Section III. We consider all of the
combinations of “shared” and “open” resources in Table II.
In many locations in the United States and around the world,
the market for cellular service is effectively a duopoly. We
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therefore consider a market with two vertically differentiated
NSPs, and the three-stage game with complete information
described in [34]:
1) NSPs i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously choose inherent quality
qi from the interval [0, qˆ].
2) NSPs i ∈ {1, 2} simultaneously set price pi.
3) Each consumer chooses to subscribe to one of the NSPs
i ∈ {1, 2} or to neither.
The quality qi is the inherent quality (with maximum
feasible value qˆ). It refers to aspects of service unrelated to
the size of the mmWave network, such as the quality of voice
calls, the quality of the legacy data network, customer service,
and the availability of desirable handsets. These measures of
quality are increasingly important once the service is well
established in the market, and has a sufficiently large network
that network size is no longer the single main criterion by
which consumers decide which NSP to subscribe to.
An NSP’s marginal costs are increasing in qi, with cost
function c(qi, ni) = qini, and so each NSP i ∈ {1, 2} seeks
to maximize its profits
pii(qi, ni, pi) = nipi − qini (2)
Consumers evaluate competing services in terms of the
difference in their inherent qualities as well as their network
externalities. We have heterogeneous consumers parameterized
by ω, with ω distributed uniformly from [0, ωˆ]. The surplus of
a consumer of type ω is given by
u(ω, qi, n˜i, pi) =
{
ωqi + µqin˜i − pi if subscribes to i
0 if no subscription
(3)
with i ∈ {1, 2} and 0 ≤ µ < min[1, ωˆ/2], where µ is explained
in the next paragraph. If the NSPs share their mmWave
network resources, then n˜i =
∑
i∈{1,2} ni, otherwise n˜i = ni.
The fifth percentile rate in a mmWave network is piecewise
linear in the network size (Fig. 9). Here we consider only
moderate- to large-sized networks, where the curves in Fig. 9
are linear. Thus the network externalities function h(n˜i) is
linear in n˜i. The scaling factor µ determines the intensity of
the network externality, i.e., h(n˜i) = µn˜i, and is empirically
derived from slopes of the lines in Fig. 9. We consider three
scenarios, each with established NSPs:
• No open resources: In this scenario we use µ = 0.7,
corresponding to the slope of the “no open resources”
line in Figure 9 for n ≥ 0.25.
• Open BS deployment: There is an open BS deployment
serving all NSPs. We use µ = 0.25, corresponsing to the
slope of the “open BS deployment” line in Fig. 9 for
n ≥ 0.35.
• Open spectrum: Spectrum is unlicensed and used by all
NSPs. We use µ = 0.4, corresponsing to the slope of the
“open spectrum” line in Fig. 9 for n ≥ 0.45.
By their choice of quality level, the NSPs segment the
market into a low-end group (small-ω type) and a high-end
group (large-ω type). Without loss of generality, we say that
NSP 1 chooses a higher quality than NSP 2, i.e., q1 > q2, and
subscribers of NSP 1 belong to the large-ω group. We define
two marginal consumers: the consumer of type ω is indifferent
between choosing no subscription and subscribing to NSP 2,
and the consumer of type ω is indifferent between subscribing
to NSP 1 and subscribing to NSP 2.
Then the utility of the marginal consumer of type ω satisfies
ωq1 + µq1n˜1 − p1 = ωq2 + µq2n˜2 − p2 (4)
and the utility of the marginal consumer of type ω satisfies
ωq2 + µq2n˜2 − p2 = 0 (5)
Also, the marginal consumer of type ω defines the market
share of the high-end service
n1 =
ωˆ − ω
ωˆ
(6)
and the marginal consumers together define the market share
of the low-end service
n2 =
ω − ω
ωˆ
(7)
We can solve (4), (5), (6), and (7) for n1, n2, ω, and ω, and
thus determine the decisions of the consumers and the market
share of each NSP given pi, qi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
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Given pi and qi i ∈ {1, 2}, it is shown in [34] that if the
ratio of quality levels satisfies
q1
q2
>
(
ωˆ2
(ωˆ − µ)(ωˆ − 2µ)
)
(8)
then there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which both NSPs
set prices higher than their marginal costs. Furthermore, if the
solution to (4), (5), (6), and (7) satisfies
0 < ω < ω < ωˆ (9)
then both NSPs have market share greater than zero. When
both (8) and (9) hold, then there is a unique Nash equilibrium
in which both NSPs earn non-zero profit. We restrict our
attention to these circumstances, since these are of primary
interest to us.
If (8) and (9) hold and the NSPs do not share resources,
then according to [34] their equilibrium prices p∗1,NS , p
∗
2,NS
are as follows:
p∗1,NS = q1
[
1+
(ωˆ − 1)[2q1(ωˆ − µ)2 − q2ωˆ(2ωˆ − µ)]
4q1(ωˆ − µ)2 − q2ωˆ2
]
> q1
(10)
p∗2,NS = q2
[
1 +
(ωˆ − 1)[q1(ωˆ − µ)(ωˆ − 2µ)− q2ωˆ2]
4q1(ωˆ − µ)2 − q2ωˆ2
]
> q2
(11)
and their equilibrium quality levels q∗1,NS , q
∗
2,NS are:
q∗1,NS = qˆ (12)
q∗2,NS =
qˆ(ωˆ−µ)2
[
11ωˆ−10µ−
√
3(3ωˆ2+28ωˆµ−20µ2)
]
2ωˆ2(7ωˆ−5µ) < qˆ (13)
The profits of the high-end NSP always increase with q1,
so it will use qˆ. The low-end NSP sets q2 to balance two
competing effects: at high values of q2 the low-end NSP has a
greater market share, but is also more similar to q1, which
increases price competition and drives the price of service
down.
Note that reducing the parameter qˆ increases price competi-
tion, since the difference in quality levels between NSPs will
be small and so consumers’ decisions will be more sensitive to
price. Similarly, reducing ωˆ increases price competition, since
this decreases the dispersion of consumers’ willingness to pay
and the market is less segmented.
If the NSPs share resources, then per [34] their equilibrium
prices p∗1,S , p
∗
2,S are:
p∗1,S = q1
[
1 +
2ωˆ(ωˆ − 1)(q1 − q2)
(4ωˆ − 3µ)q1 − ωˆq2
]
> q1 (14)
p∗2,S = q2
[
1 +
ωˆ(ωˆ − 1)(q1 − q2)
(4ωˆ − 3µ)q1 − ωˆq2
]
> q2 (15)
and their equilibrium quality levels q∗1,S , q
∗
2,S are:
q∗1,S = qˆ (16)
q∗2,S =
qˆ(4ωˆ − 3µ)
7ωˆ − 6µ < qˆ (17)
For the sake of comparison, we are also interested in the
profits of a monopoly NSP. When there is only one NSP, the
marginal consumer is defined by
ωq1 + µq1n˜1 − p1 = 0 (18)
and the market share of the NSP is
n1 =
ωˆ − ω
ωˆ
(19)
At equilibrium, the monopoly NSP will choose price
p∗1,M =
q1(ωˆ − 1)
2
(20)
and quality level
q∗1,M = qˆ (21)
Fig. 11 shows the profits of each NSP in various circum-
stances, as ωˆ (and dispersion of consumers’ willingness to
pay) increases. First, we note that the low-end NSP always
prefers to share resources. Since it captures the low end of the
market (the consumers who are less willing to pay for inherent
quality), the network effects are especially important to this
NSP. In the duopoly market, the high-end NSP paradoxically
prefers to share resources when the intensity of the network
effect is small (as when there are open resources), because its
competitor gains less of an advantage from the larger (shared)
network size. (This is consistent with the results described
in [16]). When the intensity of the network effect is large
(as it is when there are no open resources) then the high-end
NSP prefers resource sharing only when the market is highly
segmented and there is little price competition (i.e., for large
ωˆ).
Fig. 12 shows the market share of each NSP and total market
coverage (i.e., share of consumers who subscribe to either
NSP) under the same set of circumstances. When ωˆ (and the
dispersion of consumers’ willingness to pay) is small, sharing
offers the best overall market coverage. When ωˆ is large, the
best market coverage is achieved by not sharing resources. The
value of ωˆ at which the benefit of market segmentation begins
to dominate the benefit of network effects is greater when the
intensity of the network effect is high (large µ).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have connected economic models of the
strategic decision making of cellular network service providers
and subscribers, to detailed simulations of mmWave networks,
with and without resource sharing. While we have confirmed
the benefits of resource sharing from a purely technical view
(without considering the effect on demand), with the economic
analysis we have illustrated that resource sharing is not always
the preferred strategy of service providers, and some kinds
of resource sharing may be preferred over others. We have
shown that “open” deployments of neutral small cells make it
easier for networks to reach critical mass, encouraging market
entry more than “open” spectrum would. Furthermore, we have
shown that the leading service provider in a duopoly market
prefers to share resources only when sharing gains are small
or the market is highly segmented. Our technical simulations
of asymmetric service providers have hinted at this, with
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Fig. 11. Profit of each NSP for different cases of the intensity of the network effect, µ. The dotted line shows the profits of each NSP if they choose not to
share their respective resources (though they may still use any available “open” resources). The dashed line shows their profits if they share resources. The
solid line shows the profits in a monopoly market, for comparison. The horizontal axis indicates the dispersion of the consumers’ valuation of the services.
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Fig. 12. Market share of each NSP and total market coverage for different cases of the intensity of the network effect, µ. The dotted line shows the market
share of each service provider and their total market coverage if they choose not to share their respective resources (though they may still use any available
“open” resources). The dashed line shows their market shares and total market coverage if they share resources. The solid line shows the market share of a
single firm in a monopoly market, for comparison. The horizontal axis indicates the dispersion of the consumers’ valuation of the services. (qˆ = 1.5)
greater gains for the smaller service provider than the market
leader. However with a purely technical approach, one would
conclude that resource sharing is always beneficial (albeit less
beneficial for the market leader), while the economic analysis
with consideration of price and demand in addition to technical
gains has suggested a different conclusion.
We briefly discuss here some assumptions of our approach.
Our results are predicated on an assumed indirect network
effect benefitting consumers subscribing to a large service
provider. That is, we assume that the resources held by a
service provider in a given market scale together with the num-
ber of subscribers it serves. Practically, building out physical
infrastructure and licensing spectrum requires a tremendous
capital investment. A service provider is unlikely to build
out a very large network, at great cost, when it has few
subscribers and so a limited revenue stream. For this reason,
we consider it justified to tie the level of investment in the
network - and thus, the size of the network resources - to the
number of subscribers. Another assumption is that consumers
are homogeneous in their preference for one firm or the
other, given their overall valuation of network service, i.e.,
that consumers with the same ω will make the same choice
between service providers, given their price, network size, and
inherent quality. Actually, consumers and are not identical
in their valuations of competing services. However, despite
this common simplifying assumption, the general economic
framework we have applied in this paper has been empirically
validated in a variety of other industries with network effects.
The work in this paper suggests several interesting avenues
for further research. We would like to extend this model
to include the investment costs associated with deploying a
new mmWave network, which we expect to be substantially
different from traditional cellular networks given the unique
physical characteristics of the mmWave bands. We would also
like to investigate scheduling strategies that divide shared
resources among mmWave service providers in ways that
increase the benefit of resource sharing for both service
providers and consumers.
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